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Paper No. 10

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**OFFICE OF PETITIONS**

In re Application of :  
William Colin Basford :  
Application No. 09/877,585 :  
Filed: June 8, 2001 : ON PETITION  
Title of Invention: :  
APPARATUS TO REDUCE BASE :  
DRAGBEHIND BLUFF BODIES :  
:

This is a decision on the Petition to the Commissioner under 37 CFR 1.137(a) or 37 CFR 1.137(b), filed April 6, 2004, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(a) is dismissed.

The petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) is dismissed.

Any further petition to revive the above-identified application (under 37 CFR 1.137(a)), must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Request for Reconsideration of Petition under 37 CFR 1.137", and be addressed to Petitions Attorney Derek L. Woods. This is **not** final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Background:

The above-identified application became abandoned for failure to timely and properly reply to the final Office action, mailed May 27, 2003. The Office action set a three (3) month period for reply.

Applicant filed a response to the Office action on July 30, 2003; however, the response failed to place the application in condition for allowance. Applicant was so advised in an Advisory Action mailed August 26, 2003.

Applicant subsequently, on November 26, 2003, filed a Notice of Appeal and a petition under 37 CFR 1.181 requesting the Office reconsider the final Office action. No extension-of-time was filed with the Notice of Appeal.

The petition was dismissed as moot in a Decision mailed November 29, 2004, because the application was abandoned<sup>1</sup> at the time the petition was filed.

Accordingly, the application became abandoned for failure to timely and properly reply to the final Office action mailed May 27, 2003. A Notice of Abandonment was mailed on March 22, 2004.

A Grantable Petition Under 37 CFR 1.137(a)

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(a) must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply (unless previously filed), which may met by the filing of a notice of appeal and the requisite fee; a Request for Continued Examination; an amendment or request for reconsideration which *prima facie* places the application in condition for allowance, or a first or second submission under 37 CFR 1.129(a) if the application has been pending for at least two years as of June 8, 1995, taking into account any reference made in such application to any earlier filed application under 35 USC 120, 121 and 365(c); (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(1); (3) a showing to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(a) was unavoidable; and (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(c).

Applicant lacks items (1) and (3) as set forth above.

Applicable Law

The general standard applied by the Office requires petitioner to establish that petitioner treated the patent the same as a reasonable and prudent person would treat his or her most

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<sup>1</sup>The application became abandoned for Applicant's failure to timely and properly reply to the final Office action, mailed May 27, 2004. The Notice of Appeal was not timely because it did not include a request for extension-of-time and fee, and no authorization to charge fees has been located among the application papers.

important business.<sup>2</sup> 35 U.S.C. 41(c)(1) states, "The Commissioner may accept the payment of any maintenance fee ... at any time ... if the delay is shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to have been unavoidable." (emphasis added). "In the specialized field of patent law, ... the Commissioner of Patent and Trademarks is primarily responsible for the application and enforcement of the various narrow and technical statutory and regulatory provisions. His interpretation of those provisions is entitled to considerable deference." Rydeen v. Quigg, 748 F.Supp. 900, 904, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876 (D.D.C. 1990), aff'd without opinion (Rule 36), 937 F.2d 623 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Morganroth v. Quigg, 885 F.2d 843, 848, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1125 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1152 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("an agency' interpretation of a statute it administers is entitled to deference"); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 81 L. Ed. 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984) ("if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.")).

"The critical phrase 'unless it be shown to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that such delay was unavoidable' has remained unchanged since first enacted in 1861." Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The standard for "unavoidable" delay for reinstating a patent is the same as the unavoidable standard for reviving an application. See Ray v. Lehman, 55 F.3d 606, 608-609, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing In re patent No. 4,409,763, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1800 (Comm'r Pat. 1990); Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). The court in In re Mattullath, accepted the standard which had been proposed by Commissioner Hall which "requires no more or greater care or diligence than is generally used and observed by prudent and careful men in relation to their most important business." In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-515 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)). However, "The question of whether an applicant's delay in prosecuting an application was unavoidable [will] be decided on a case-by-case basis, taking

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<sup>2</sup> The Commissioner is responsible for determining the standard for unavoidable delay and for applying that standard.

all of the facts and circumstances into account."<sup>3</sup> Nonawareness of the content of, or a misunderstanding of, PTO statutes, PTO rules, the MPEP, or Official Gazette notices, does not constitute unavoidable delay.<sup>4</sup> The statute requires a "showing" by petitioner. Therefore, petitioner has the burden of proof. The decision will be based solely on the written, administrative record in existence. It is not enough that the delay was unavoidable; petitioner must prove that the delay was unavoidable. A petition will not be granted if petitioner provides insufficient evidence to "show" that the delay was unavoidable.

Applicant is further advised that the Patent and Trademark Office must rely on the actions or inactions of duly authorized and voluntarily chosen representatives of the applicant, and applicant is bound by the consequences of those actions or inactions. Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962); Huston v. Ladner, 973 F.2d 1564, 1567, 23 USPQ2d 1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 317, 5 USPQ2d 1130, 1132 (D.N. Ind. 1987). Specifically, petitioner's delay caused by the actions or inactions of his voluntarily chosen representative does not constitute unavoidable delay within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 133 or 37 CFR 1.137(a). Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 5 USPQ2d 1130 (D. Ind. 1987); Smith v. Diamond, 209 USPQ 1091 (D.D.C. 1981); Potter v. Dann, 201 USPQ 574 (D.D.C. 1978); Ex parte Murray, 1891 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 130, 131 (Comm'r Pat. 1891). In re Mattullath, 38 App. D.C. 497, 514-15 (1912) (quoting Ex parte Pratt, 1887 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 31, 32-33 (1887)); see also Winkler v. Ladd, 221 F. Supp. 550, 552, 138 USPQ 666, 167-68 (D.D.C. 1963), aff'd, 143 USPQ 172 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Ex parte Henrich, 1913 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 139, 141 (1913).

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<sup>3</sup> Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (1982).

<sup>4</sup> See Smith v. Mossinghoff, 671 F.2d 533, 538, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 977 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (citing Potter v. Dann, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 574 (D. D.C. 1978) for the proposition that counsel's nonawareness of PTO rules does not constitute "unavoidable" delay); Vincent v. Mossinghoff, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23119, 13, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 621 (D. D.C. 1985) (Plaintiffs, through their counsel's actions, or their own, must be held responsible for having noted the MPEP section and Official Gazette notices expressly stating that the certified mailing procedures outlined in 37 CFR 1.8(a) do not apply to continuation applications.) (Emphasis added).

Finally, a "delay (in responding) resulting from the lack of knowledge or improper application of the patent statute, rules of practice, or MPEP, [] does not constitute unavoidable delay." MPEP 711.03(c).

Applicant's Assertion

Applicant files the instant petition and asserts that a timely amendment was filed within two (2) months of the final Office action. Applicant asserts that the filing was "clearly proper in all respects." Petition at pp.4-5. Applicant further asserts that this Office's mail room lost documents that applicant filed, and that "[i]t certainly constitutes unavoidable situation when such a timely amended case is held abandoned because of lost documents." Petition at p.6.

It is initially noted that Applicant's Notice of Appeal contained a Certificate of Mailing (37 CFR 1.8) noting the mail date of the Notice of Appeal as November 26, 2003; however, a Notice of Appeal must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR §§ 1.134 and 1.136. See, 37 CFR 1.191. Here, the final Office action was mailed May 27, 2003, and provided a shortened statutory reply period of three (3) months. Having failed to obtain any extensions-of-time, the application became abandoned on August 28, 2003.

As to item (1), Applicant has failed to provide the required reply. As noted supra, the Notice of Appeal was untimely as it failed to include an extension-of- time request and fee. The Amendment, filed on July 30, 2003 in response to the May 27, 2003 final Office action, failed to place the application in condition for allowance. Applicant was so notified in the Advisory Action mailed August 26, 2003.

Applicant must file the required reply to the final Office action.

As to item (3), Applicant has failed to demonstrate that the delay in responding to the final Office action was unavoidable. Applicant asserts that the Amendment, filed July 30, 2003, was timely; however, the reply to an Office action must be both timely and proper. As provided in 37 CFR § 1.135,

[p]rosecution of an application to save it from abandonment pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section must include such complete and proper reply as the condition of the application may require. The admission of, or refusal to admit, any amendment after final rejection or any amendment not responsive to the last action, or any related proceedings, will not operate to save the application from abandonment.

37 CFR § 1.135(b)

Regarding Applicant's assertion that the PTO mail-room lost Applicant's documents, Applicant provided a proper Certificate of Mailing and the documents, whenever they were located or re-transmitted, would have received a filing date as of the date of the Certificate of Mailing; however, the documents were not timely because Applicant failed to file the appropriate extension-of-time request and fee.

A Grantable Petition Under 37 CFR 1.137(b)

A grantable petition to revive an abandoned application under 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply (unless previously filed); (2) the petition fee required by 37 CFR 1.17(m); (3) a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional; and (4) if required, a terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)). Applicant lacks item (1).

Applicant lacks items (1) and (3).

As to item (1), as stated supra, Applicant has failed to provide the required reply.

As to item (3), Applicant must provide a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional.

Further correspondence with respect to this matter should be addressed as follows:

By mail:           Commissioner for Patents  
                  PO Box 1450  
                  Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

By facsimile: (703) 308-6916  
                  Attn: Office of Petitions

By hand:           220 20<sup>th</sup> Street S.  
                  Customer Window  
                  Crystal Plaza Two, Lobby Room 1B03  
                  Arlington, VA 22202

Telephone inquiries concerning this matter should be directed to  
the undersigned at (571) 272-3232.

*Derek Woods*  
Derek L. Woods  
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Office of Petitions